Very Short Abstract: I develop a new Hybrid account of the nature of normative concepts and use it to explain away the Reductivist-unfriendly "just too different" intuition.
Very Short Abstract: After explaining why we cannot know the true "first-order" ethical theory, I show, among other things, how Reductive Realists can appeal to this fact to defend their view from an influential objection.
5. "Double Review" of On What Matters Volume Three by Derek Parfit and Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity edited by Peter Singer
[published draft] [penultimate draft]
Very Short Abstract: Over the course of summarizing Volume Three and Does Anything Really Matter?, I argue that Parfit does not give us strong reason to think that Naturalists, Expressivists, and Non-Realist Cognitivists agree.
Very Short Abstract: We critically survey, for a general philosophical audience, various positions on the nature, use, possession, and analysis of normative concepts, while highlighting some underappreciated problems for such positions along the way.
3. Non-Analytical Naturalism and the Nature of Normative Thought: A Reply to Parfit
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2015)
Very Short Abstract: I show that Derek Parfit's (2011) argument for the claim that Synthetic Reductive Realism is either false or incoherent fails.
Very Short Abstract: I argue that there are several unacknowledged premises that Stephen Finlay (2014) needs to derive Reductivism about the metaphysics of goodness from his semantics for 'good'.
Very Short Abstract: I summarize Cuneo's attempt to derive Non-Reductivism in ethics from the fact that we perform speech acts, and suggest, among other things, that Cuneo's book contains resources for offering a new challenge to expressivists.